Albert Memmi in the Era of Decolonization by McBride, Keally
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 2 (2011)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.491 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 
 
This journal is operated by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh 
as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is co-sponsored by the 
University of Pittsburgh Press 
 
Albert Memmi in the Era of 
Decolonization  
Keally McBride 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie 
française et de langue française, Vol XIX, No 2 (2011) pp 50-66  
 
Vol XIX, No 2 (2011) 
ISSN 1936-6280 (print) 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.491 
www.jffp.org 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 2 (2011)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.491 
Albert Memmi in the Era of 
Decolonization  
Keally McBride 
The University of San Francisco 
Paradoxically, it’s harder to be a writer in the postcolonial period than 
during colonization.  
 
—Albert Memmi 
This statement may be one of the most important insights that Albert 
Memmi produces in his 2004 book, Portrait du décolonisé:  arabo-musulman et 
de quelques autres.  The work was published in a 2006 English edition as 
Decolonization and the Decolonized, and its title echoes Memmi‟s The Colonizer 
and the Colonized that has served as an introduction to the psychology and 
mutual dependence of the colonial era for countless students.1  While The 
Colonizer and the Colonized is still assigned, studied, and generally revered, 
Decolonization and the Decolonized fell with a thud on the postcolonial political 
landscape and seems destined for obscurity.  What can the different fortunes 
of these books reveal about the ever fraught relationship between power, 
perspective and social criticism in the era of decolonization? 
One of the most electrifying elements of The Colonizer and the Colonized 
was its ability to present the pathos of the colonial experience from both 
positions.  While anti-imperialism had been a long-standing political 
movement, Memmi‟s book paused to dissect the colonial relationship, it did 
not solely aim to end it.  Anti-imperialist leaders had long decried the 
injustices of colonialism, presenting themselves as misunderstood, powerful 
and equal human beings. Memmi‟s book offered what seemed at the time to 
be a breathtakingly honest portrait of the insecurities, dependencies and 
humiliations of the colonial relationship.2  The intention and result was to 
catalyze opposition to colonization.  Memmi‟s “theatrical method of 
presenting the colonizer and the colonized as if they were characters on a 
stage” was intended to reveal how both groups participate in and then 
become disfigured in a diabolic world.3  Never though, is there a question of 
with whom Memmi‟s loyalties are placed.  Not part of either group, but 
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“sandwiched between French master and Muslim majority” as a Jew, 
Memmi leverages his intimate knowledge of segregation within colonial 
Tunisia to subvert the colonial power structure.4 
How far our analyses of colonialism and postcolonialism have come 
since 1955!    In The Colonizer and the Colonized, Memmi was the consummate 
outsider, able to present startling truths that changed his readers‟ 
perceptions of their own actions and beliefs.   Today, it is difficult to know 
upon what grounds to stand to critique postcolonial power relations, thanks 
to the seminal contributions of Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak.  Factual 
analyses can be dismissed as paradigmatic of an imperialist, normative gaze; 
historical studies can be accused of fetishizing the colonial experience; 
nonindigenous scholars are vulnerable to being labeled misinformed 
interlopers; indigenous scholars cannot be taken as representative of a 
nation, identity or position.  Since there is no safe ground to stand on, it 
might seem that all positions are somewhat equal in their disadvantages.  
But this is not the case, as Memmi‟s Decolonization and the Decolonized can 
demonstrate.  Postcolonial analyses must remain committed to subverting 
power relations no matter how complex or simple their epistemological 
stance may be.  The ability to draw a clear dividing line between power and 
powerlessness remains elusive; nonetheless, the spirit of the critic must be to 
question the assumptions on both sides of that line. A closer analysis of 
Memmi‟s books will help to demonstrate the significance of this point. 
Memmi begins his introduction to Decolonization and the Decolonized 
with the statement, “Rarely have I had so little desire to write a book” (ix). 
Yet he argues that a companion volume to The Colonized and the Colonized 
was desperately needed. What has become of the formerly 
colonizing/colonized people?  Why does the world still seem to vibrate 
according to the beat of the colonial era?  He points out, “During the first 
years of independence, attentive and well-meaning observers grew 
concerned about the persistent poverty of formerly colonized peoples.  Fifty 
years later nothing really seems to have changed, except for the worse” (x). 
How can we make sense of this odd era when formal colonization has ended 
and yet the inequalities between the former colonizer/colonized persist? 
More importantly, what kind of criticism can contribute to changing these 
inequalities? 
What drove Memmi to overcome his stated reluctance to write the book 
was his belief that the standard narrative told about the postcolonial era is 
wrong. In short, Memmi believes the failures of decolonization tend to be 
blamed upon the former colonizer.  While of course colonial legacies exist, 
he insists, “Colonization has committed enough crimes of its own; it would 
be pointless to attribute to it those it did not commit” (22). Many people are 
familiar with such arguments: colonization implanted economic structures 
that continue to create poverty; neocolonialism in the guise of global capital 
continues to pillage resources; the brutalities of colonial rule developed a 
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misshapen postcolonial state and system of authority; or most commonly, 
the ethnic conflicts that riddle postcolonial regimes are the result of poorly 
drawn borders by colonial powers.  Interestingly, Memmi does not simply 
reject these perspectives.   He points out for example, “The presidents of the 
new republics generally mimic what is most arbitrary about the colonial 
power,” acknowledging a continuing legacy of colonialism (60).  
But Memmi believes that all too frequently the corrupt rulers of 
postcolonial regimes use narratives of colonial legacies as diversions or 
excuses for their own ill intentions.  He doesn‟t want to discard the inquiry 
into colonial residues as much as supplement them:  
Without underestimating the role of its relations with its 
global partners, or the rise to power of the American 
empire, which took over where the colonizers left off, it 
would be more useful to inquire into the internal causes of 
this stagnation. (65)  
Early in the text, Memmi presents the term “dolorism” to try and 
encapsulate the position of the decolonized:  “Dolorism is a natural tendency 
to exaggerate one‟s pains and attribute them to another” (19). 
Anticolonialism was supposed to be about recovering agency by destroying 
the social roles created by colonialism, but Memmi is infuriated by the 
resurrection of irresponsibility on the part of “the decolonized” and their 
leaders.  The decolonized continues to think of himself as powerless, thereby 
averting responsibility for the present and future. (The decolonized is 
always a him and not a her, but more on that below.) He argues that 
perceptions of the world and its inequalities that emphasize the continued 
legacy of colonialism perpetuate dependence, helplessness, lethargy, and 
ultimately violence.   
He decided to write Decolonization and the Decolonized because he thinks 
that as long as the sources of postcolonial difficulties are misapprehended, 
they will not be overcome. There are two main preoccupations in 
Decolonization and the Decolonized:  corruption and fundamentalism.   He 
fingers corruption in postcolonial regimes rather than the legacies of the 
colonizers as the primary source of continued poverty and political 
oppression.  By emphasizing the greed, complicity and incompetence of 
postcolonial rulers, Memmi locates himself in the tradition of social critics 
who point out the complicity of leaders in the decimation of their own 
people.  
Memmi provides an interesting alternative to arguments that see 
Islamic fundamentalism as a response to neoimperialism and globalization.  
Fundamentalism is presented as a corollary to corruption in postcolonial 
regimes. Corruption stifles economic development and kills political 
freedom. Tyrannical leaders disregard the lives of their own citizens, and 
soon the decolonized has little security, no prospects, and low self-regard.   
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Is there a choice between tyranny and permanent 
disorder?  What can be done in the face of an apparently 
incurable illness, other than to resign oneself to it or flee?  
Faced with a dead-end future, the decolonized dream of 
escape. (68)  
The decolonized escape into fundamentalism and the dream of a past 
integrity and purity, which is then expressed as fury.  Or they decide to 
immigrate, often to the country of the former colonizer whose language and 
culture is most familiar.  These two interlocking stories present the cast of 
characters that populate Decolonization and the Decolonized:  the tyrant, the 
former colonizer, and then variations of the decolonized who appears as the 
immigrant, the fundamentalist and the terrorist.  
 Memmi sets out in this book to make his readers uncomfortable, one of 
the more noble goals of political philosophy.   The critical responses to the 
text demonstrate that he certainly succeeded.   But why have people disliked 
this book so much?  Memmi suggests that the difficult, even stony, reception 
his book has received is due to the fact that it presents a truth that we are not 
ready to accept. However, I think the answer lies in his statement that it is 
much more difficult to be a writer in an era of decolonization than an age of 
colonialism.  In short, Memmi‟s recent work helps us to understand why a 
contemporary companion volume to The Colonizer and the Colonized cannot 
be written.  The tools and perspectives that helped achieve a new 
understanding of colonial power relations do not illuminate postcolonial 
power relations.    
Critical Response 
In the Afterword to Decolonization and the Decolonized, Memmi makes his 
own observations about its reception in France and elsewhere.  First he notes 
the lack of response from the group he characterizes as the ex-colonized: 
“…among my readers the ex-colonized and their descendants were 
apparently not scandalized, not even surprised by my project.  On the 
contrary, it was as if they were expecting it.”   Media aimed at France‟s 
immigrant communities have given the argument a “generous and 
courteous” reading (145). On the other hand, the media of the former 
colonizer have, in his view, silenced the book.  While they noted its 
publication, little has been made of its substance, and no critical response to 
the Memmi‟s arguments about decolonization has occurred.  He asserts, “I 
take some consolation in realizing that, aside from my disappointment as an 
author, this weighty silence suggests, on the contrary, the accuracy of my 
claims“ (148).  Memmi believes he has delivered the difficult truth, which no 
one wants to confront. 
On the face of it, this rationalization makes little sense.  Why would the 
“ex-colonized” be willing to take his criticism of their inability to integrate in 
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French society, the decline of their home countries, and the failure of the 
decolonization process with little comment?  And wouldn‟t the former 
colonizers be more than happy to shift blame onto the shoulders of corrupt 
leaders and immigrants, away from questions about neocolonialism and the 
long-term difficulties resulting from the colonial era?   
Perhaps Memmi‟s audience is different from who he imagines it to be.  
One can imagine policy makers, such as lawmakers who voted to outlaw 
wearing burqas and niqabs in France finding satisfaction in his arguments. 
He might have been imagining influencing that elusive “public opinion” or 
even leaders who would decide upon debt forgiveness and development 
initiatives.  However, his natural audience is academics and leftists familiar 
with the critique of colonial power and the colonial era, and the book 
particularly disappoints those readers. 
A reminder of the primary lessons of The Colonizer and the Colonized will 
help establish why the Decolonization and the Decolonized would find a poor 
reception with the same audience.  Memmi presents a structural analysis of 
power relations, encouraging us to look beyond the morals, beliefs and 
proclivities of the individuals involved to see larger systematic effects of the 
global world order.  Even if one was a colonizer who wanted to uplift and 
educate, one‟s participation in the system made one a colonizer.  One cannot 
separate colonizers into the good (missionaries starting schools) and bad 
(diamond mine owners who enslaved children).  Nor can one point to 
colonial subjects who were complicit and those who were not.  Individual 
agency is to some extent beside the point.  Second, Memmi points out that 
even though the colonial order is based upon a binary opposition between 
the colonizer and the colonized that is reinforced through educational, 
spatial, racial and national segregation, the two roles are inextricably 
connected.  The colonial order produces both the colonized and the 
colonizer.  Taking the argument of The Colonizer and the Colonized seriously 
means that one regards the notion of individual agency with suspicion and 
sees power and identity as relational.  In other words, the analysis of power 
contained in Memmi‟s earlier work would naturally make one wary of the 
distinct categories and assumptions contained in Memmi‟s work about “the 
decolonized.”   
Many of the reviews start with an endorsement of his earlier work, The 
Colonizer and the Colonized, and then proceed to excoriate his recent work.  To 
be precise, the critical responses to Decolonization and the Decolonized level 
three interrelated charges against the book, questioning its method, the 
author‟s relationship to his subject, and finally the ethical relationship 
between the book and the world it attempts to describe.   It seems to me that 
these are the issues that are at the core of social criticism and always have 
been. Revisiting these issues in relation to Memmi‟s latest work can thus 
help us to consider how the work of criticism can assist decolonization 
today. 
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Method 
Memmi‟s representation of characters in the world‟s political drama is 
the strongest resemblance between Decolonization and the Decolonized and The 
Colonizer and the Colonized.  The figures that animate these two works-- “the 
colonized”, “the colonizer”, “the decolonized” and “the immigrant”--have 
no individual personalities, instead their actions and thoughts become 
allegorical, as they represent a social and political position above all.  Just as 
Bertolt Brecht sought to encourage identification and investment through 
allegorical figures, Memmi develops generalized characters so his readers 
can identify themselves, their neighbors, their family members, and even 
their enemies in the roles. One of the primary messages of The Colonizer and 
the Colonized was that colonialism robs people of their particularity and 
constrains their actions and self-perceptions to such an extent that human 
beings become reduced to playing roles in scripts.  Hence, the emphasis on 
positionality as opposed to individual agency is appropriate for the subject.  
In The Colonizer and the Colonized, Memmi argues that “colonial relations do 
not stem from individual goodwill or actions; they exist before the 
colonizer‟s arrival or his birth, and whether he accepts or rejects them 
matters little” (38). However, today this same generality can grate upon the 
reader; we understand the social construction of identity, and criticism is 
instead supposed to create spaces outside of such readily available roles. 
In fact, recent readers have started to object to Memmi‟s characters in 
The Colonizer and the Colonized.  Most notably, Earthscan issued a new edition 
of this work in 2003 with an unusually critical introduction by Nadine 
Gordimer.  Gordimer railed against Memmi‟s dismissal of anti-colonial 
Europeans, pointing to her own experience in South Africa as evidence that 
alliances do matter in overturning a colonial regime and helping to establish 
a postcolonial one.  
Michael Neocosmos‟s review of Decolonization asserts that the portraits 
in The Colonizer and the Colonized were illuminating, but now they are simply 
stereotypes. Neocosmos observes:  
The problem with portraits is that they search for an 
essence; once discovered that „essence‟ is presumed to 
represent the whole of the phenomenon.  But essences can 
also collapse into a stereotype, providing simplistic 
answers, if not also vulgar prejudices.5    
Neocosmos says these portraits become a stereotype because they exist 
without specificity and any historical context. This claim could also be 
applied to The Colonizer and the Colonized, but Neocosmos curiously avoids 
doing so.  Instead, it seems the real source of his discomfort is that Memmi 
no longer approaches his characters with the same grace and sympathy and 
identification:   
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[W]hereas in the first work Memmi was writing from the 
point of view of one who had experienced the colonial 
situation from within, he now clearly writes form the 
perspective of a European commenting from afar.  It is as 
if the diaspora experience has led to such a process of 
acculturation that the author has lost the capacity to think 
through the lenses that made his initial book such a 
success.6   
In other words, because Memmi is now an outsider, he cannot use the same 
method.  If this is the case, it is the critic‟s position vis a vis his subject, more 
than his method of exposition, that matters. 
The Critic 
Memmi presented his status as a Tunisian Jew as a benefit in The 
Colonizer and the Colonized.  Separated from other Tunisians, he was not fully 
encapsulated by the position of either colonizer or colonized, even though 
he grew up in a society structured by that binary.  In his Preface to the text, 
he admits that he was able to write the role of both colonizer and colonized 
from his personal experience as a Tunisian Jew:  “Here is a confession I have 
never made before:  I know the position of the colonizer from the inside 
almost as well as I know the colonized” (xiii). His position as “other” within  
a colonial society gave him unique psychological access to both of the roles 
that he outlined, but also gave him sympathy for the plight of those unable 
to control the terms of their identity.  He points out that Jews were “one 
small notch above the Moslem on the pyramid which is the basis of all 
colonial societies” (xiv).  In wanting to oppose the position of the colonized, 
he chose to relinquish the small advantages afforded him by the colonizer.  
Even though Memmi identifies with the characters he describes in this book, 
he is not one of them. This is because he views himself as an unusual 
product of the same world. 
Though his Jewish identity helped him to write The Colonizer and the 
Colonized, it has become a source of tension between Memmi and his 
anticolonial readers in the years since.  As Lisa Lieberman points out, 
“Critics of Zionism have been applying the lessons of The Colonizer and the 
Colonized to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1970‟s, although Memmi 
has always resisted this analogy.”7  Memmi has supported the state of Israel 
and its actions consistently, leading to a general skepticism about his 
progressive credentials.   
More importantly, both Lisa Lieberman and Joan Cocks bring up the 
possibility that Memmi‟s political commitments might be distorting his self-
recognition and hence his critical insight. Lisa Lieberman laments Memmi‟s 
loss of honesty and its impact upon his philosophy in her review:  
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Memmi‟s willingness to turn himself inside out, if need be, 
in order to illuminate some larger social dilemma, be it 
colonialism, racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism, is not in 
evidence in this book.  Had he been able to engage in the 
same unflinchingly honest self-analysis as he exhibited in 
his earlier works, Decolonization and the Decolonized might 
have provided its readers with insights no less stunning.8  
 If the critic is not clear about where she stands in her world, how can she 
even begin to recognize her own potentially distorting assumptions and 
beliefs?   
Joan Cocks‟s work on Memmi also suggests why he might have so little 
sympathy for the decolonized. Turning to The Colonizer and the Colonized she 
identifies Memmi with his own description of the “Nero Complex”: the 
psychology of someone who has usurped power and who seeks legitimacy 
for his new privilege.  
The Nero figure seeks absolution by rewriting history, 
extinguishing memories, glorifying his own merits, 
harping on the faults of the group he usurps and 
physically crushing that group to prevent it from 
demanding recognition of its humanity from him.  But the 
more he oppresses, the more illegitimate he becomes in his 
own eyes and the more he hates his victim for turning him 
into a tyrant.9  
This is a more nuanced description of why oppression begets more 
oppression.  Of course, Memmi is not exactly a tyrant oppressing the 
decolonized, but there are two points worth making here.  Could it be that 
Memmi is angry at the decolonized for casting moral aspersions on his 
relative privilege as a professor in a French university?  He does not want to 
play the role of the oppressor, but if he is part of this global framework, 
what else could he be given their relative disadvantage?  Perhaps he is angry 
that their continued struggles point to his position as insider in the 
geopolitical framework.  Second, why didn‟t Memmi consider the Nero 
Complex in his exploration of the corruption of many postcolonial rulers?  
Why assume that the colonial past has no impact upon their psychology and 
actions? 
Memmi adopts the position of outsider in Decolonization and the 
Decolonized.  This is somewhat surprising since Memmi is a Tunisian who 
has resettled in France.   Since one of the characters is the immigrant who 
leaves his native country searching for freedom in the country of his former 
colonizer, one might expect him to sympathize with this position.  But 
echoing the strategy of The Colonizer and the Colonized, Memmi does not 
occupy any of the characters that he describes.  On the one hand, you can 
say that this is absolutely the correct position for Memmi to take.  Given the 
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arguments advanced by Gyatri Spivak in “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, for 
instance, it would be very dangerous for a sociology professor who has been 
living in Paris for forty years to presume to speak on behalf of the average 
immigrant in France.  Equally preposterous would be his speaking as a 
Tunisian.   It is far better that he speaks as an outside observer.  On the other 
hand, a close reading of the book would lead one to conclude that the 
position of outside observer is not exactly neutral (could it ever be?).  
He does use the word “we” occasionally.  Tellingly, Memmi‟s “we” is 
not those who are involved in decolonization, instead “we” has become 
universal. Towards the end of the book, he includes one passage of extended 
reflection on what “we” should do.  He elaborates:   
By „we‟ I mean all the inhabitants of the planet, for this 
question affects all of us, former oppressors, formerly 
oppressed, and even those who believe they remain 
outside history. (128)  
Memmi argues that travel, technology and economy have made all 
inhabitants of the planet newly interdependent, and therefore the condition 
of all peoples must concern us.  This is a form of universal humanism, but 
what is remarkable is his notion that this kind of interdependence is new, 
brought to us by globalization, not colonialism.   His “we” is produced, as 
we become part of the global market, the unified world of Thomas 
Friedman, not the interpenetration of consciousness described by Frantz 
Fanon. Memmi also uses the word “we” in the text when he parrots the 
shocked view of the “average” news consumer.  Memmi‟s “we” is universal, 
but the positions he is dissecting in the book are particular.  He argues that 
“we” are impacted by “their” plight.   His encouragement that “we” should 
care is what most signals that he still sees the decolonized as standing 
outside of generalized humanity.   
All of this is to say that Memmi‟s position as a critic is precarious, but 
indeed, so is virtually everyone else‟s.  And this may be one of the reasons it 
is difficult to find a very robust genre of social criticism today that is aimed 
at solving global inequalities, corruption, and political violence. There are 
many excellent books that expose and describe these phenomena, rousing 
our indignation, that end with some suggestions for political and personal 
action.  But, writers that seek to alter our consciousness and create 
affiliations where none existed previously are few.  
Text/World 
The last issue here is the relationship between the text and the world.   
One of the other repeated criticisms of Memmi‟s Decolonization is that is 
simply gets the world wrong. For instance, Françoise Verges claims that 
Memmi “ignores” global economics (a charge that is not entirely true), but 
she is correct that “he does not see central aspects of current brutality” in its 
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economic forms.10  Multiple reviews point out that he paints too broad of 
strokes, assuming that the situations of the decolonized in places as 
disparate as Paraguay, Sierra Leone and Vietnam can be captured by a 
single ideal type.  Joana Pinto asks, “Can we talk about all these countries 
and all these ethnic groups from a remote point of view, so far away that we 
reach the point where we see there no longer is any difference at all?” 11 Yet 
another critic says his characterizations of rulers as tyrants ignore the 
democratic processes that are in place, and his description of the lack of 
responsibility taken by the decolonized ignores the movements for social 
change that are occurring around the globe.12  
If Memmi‟s generalizations about the colonized helped to fuel a world 
wide anticolonial struggle, why are they insufficient for a similarly 
pervasive postcolonial political landscape?  Seeing colonialism as a system 
which needed to be dismantled in order to make choice available was a 
catalyzing vision in the 1950‟s and 1960‟s.  Megan Vaughan argued in 2006, 
“The Coloniser and the Colonized is a book of its time” implying that it is not a 
book of our times.13   Memmi was pleading for an inclusive humanism in the 
1950‟s that would overturn the explicitly racist structure of global politics.  
Today, with a formally inclusive international framework that presumably 
has embraced human rights, universal humanism is the song of the 
conquerers.  Opposing current inequalities means adopting an alternative 
language. 
Edward Said‟s essay „Traveling Theory” broached this issue in 1983, 
when he observed that theory is created out of a specific historical juncture, 
and that often, when theories reappear in other contexts, they lack the force 
or insight that they initially had.14  In a later re-evaluation of this argument, 
Said decided that the withering of a theory through travel was not 
inevitable.  He offered a reading of Fanon‟s adoption of Hegelian dialectics 
and Lukács‟ theory of reification to demonstrate that theory can also become 
reinvigorated by traveling in time and/or space.15  He concluded that a 
theory could become either more or less powerful when it appears in a 
different context. This is relevant because Memmi‟s understands 
Decolonization and the Decolonized as an update of his earlier work and uses 
the same theoretical paradigm, transported across half a century.  Because 
many patterns of inequality persist, he assumed that the same paradigm 
holds.   
The relationship of theory and the world is at stake here. If change is 
what is desired, for the theorist the issue is what will allow her to generate 
that change.  One needs to look at the world to determine what kinds of 
theories might be revolutionary in a given context.  In the era of 
colonization, we needed theories to help break through the accepted “facts” 
of the colonial encounter that were generated by the colonizing force.  These 
theories also illuminated the interaction between self-conceptions and social 
contexts.  For instance, the actions of colonialism were accompanied by 
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theories of civilizational advance.  Anticolonial theorists could challenge 
imperialism based on its own rhetoric and the self-conception of the 
colonizers. Gandhi‟s Hind Swaraj questioned the very existence of English 
civilization; Aimé Cesaire simply asked, “Colonization and civilization?”16 
Just as the Cesaires used surrealism in their critiques of colonialism to enable 
their audiences to see the world anew, so anticolonial theory was intended 
to provide a new interpretation of the fact of European superiority. 17     
But is this same analysis going to affect change in the postcolonial era?  
A pressing question is whether anticolonial analysis requires that we still 
take the positions of colonizer and colonized as given, or if we should be 
trying to transcend them.   The issue is both theoretical and historical.  Has 
the world changed enough that these categories are no longer salient?  Does 
using them start to prevent change by dragging the analytical lenses of the 
past into the present and hence the future? Being able to see through the 
claims of colonialism does not necessarily end it. There are no satisfactory 
answers to these questions yet, only a great deal of thought provoking work 
still to be done.18  But this is precisely the set of rocks that shipwrecks 
Memmi‟s project in Decolonization and the Decolonized.  He is bitterly 
disappointed that the dichotomy of former colonizer and formerly colonized 
seems to resonate and that dependence and inequality have not been 
overcome.  Yet he uses the same theoretical paradigm as he developed fifty 
years ago by assuming essentialized positions for his characters and 
presenting them as opposing protagonists in a continuing drama.  But what 
if, as we have suggested, the theory that once illuminated the relations of 
coloniality now obfuscates the relations of decolonization?  
Power and Agency in an Era of Decolonization 
The division between the ex-participants in the system of colonialism 
and the universal “we” is problematic from a postcolonial perspective on 
power as well.  There is no country on the earth that has not been impacted 
by the colonial practices of the last three centuries.  Systems of knowledge, 
global trade, cultural presentation, law and language are just a few areas of 
inquiry that that have been explored in relation to colonial history.   There is 
no “outside” of the international system of domination.  Everyone would be 
able to see himself or herself as a participant in a colonial world if only they 
know how to look critically.  
Admittedly, this insight provides much difficulty for the social critic.   If 
the entire world today is properly understood as postcolonial, how can one 
possibly make sense of it? If the ideological and systemic structures of 
domination encompass everything we can see, how can we ever really gain 
the necessary perspective to understand their operations?  This is why Said‟s 
linkage of Lukacs‟ notion of reification and colonialism is worth further 
consideration.  Has this understanding of postcolonialism become yet 
another form of universalism, imposing a framework that obfuscates the 
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differences of history and character?  This is why monographic works that 
detail particular colonial encounters, histories, and figures are greeted with 
much less trepidation than the kind of general analyses offered by earlier 
anti-imperialist writers such as Cesaire, Fanon and Memmi.  Now the task is 
to see colonialism everywhere, but only in its particularities.   
 As in analyses of all hegemonic systems, the problem of agency also 
becomes paramount.  Memmi‟s earlier work on colonialism made the issue 
of individual agency less important.  However, capturing agency has always 
been the central goal of movements of decolonization.19  The predominant 
model of agency is largely individualistic, and is exactly the 
conceptualization of freedom that postcolonial theorists have tried to put 
into question.  Perhaps postcolonial theory in some way runs at odds with 
the political aspirations of decolonization.     
Memmi‟s Decolonization and the Decolonized repeatedly demonstrates this 
troubled relationship with agency. He continues to see individual 
perceptions and behaviors as constrained by the environment, yet he also 
wants to urge individual responsibility.   
Any totalization is a mistake and unjust, but there are 
objective conditions that force themselves upon nearly all 
members of a group.  Even though they deny it or are not 
fully conscious of it, they are aware of it in their thoughts 
and in their actions. (91)  
While it might be argued that bringing awareness to the objective conditions 
would allow one to respond differently, Memmi dismisses this possibility.  
“[T]he decolonized, especially an immigrant, has no choice other than to live 
out the conflicts that arise from immersion in another culture” (106). How 
then, are the decolonized supposed to act differently?  Memmi joins an 
excellent company of critics who also try to find territory between 
hegemony and individual agency, yet he does too little to acknowledge the 
difficulty in Decolonization and the Decolonized.  
Similarly, it is unclear whether what Memmi calls “the Arab world” is 
an international force in its own right or simply subject to some sort of 
Hegelian telos.  Sometimes it seems there is no point in resisting European 
and American dominance as the tide of history: “The Arab world has still 
not found or has not wanted to consider, the transformations that would 
enable it to adapt to the modern world, which it cannot help but absorb” 
(65). At other points, he laments the dynamics put into place by terrorism, 
which produce “a highly damaging representation of Arab-Muslim society.”  
“Rather than relieving its suffering, it maintains it within a vicious circle; 
uncontrolled violence arouses worldwide hostility, and this hostility 
increases suffering.” (66) Memmi urges the decolonized to “seize freedom”, 
but what this means to him is accepting capitalist economic development, 
secularism, and the existing international juridical-legal order.   
6 2  |  A l b e r t  M e m m i  i n  t h e  E r a  o f  D e c o l o n i z a t i o n  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 2 (2011)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.491 
How Memmi deploys gender in this argument suggests he too may be 
subject to social forces of which he is not fully aware.  In order to emphasize 
this form of freedom as salutary rather than hegemonic, he points to the 
need to emancipate the women who have been suffering under the 
insecurities of the decolonized.  As I mentioned earlier, the decolonized is 
always referred to as a “he”, allowing Memmi to repeatedly imply that 
women have not yet been decolonized.   But now, women in former colonial 
countries are subject to new tyrants, new humiliations passed on by the 
fundamentalists and immigrant patriarchs who wish to segregate their 
wives and daughters in order to express their resentment of the dominant 
culture.  Memmi calls the Hijab “a portable ghetto” (88).  By gendering “the 
decolonized” as male, he is able to make him both victim and victimizer, an 
obstacle to be overcome in the interest of the freedom of those even more 
dispossessed.  Obviously, the resonance with colonial exhortations to free 
women around the world is evident.  But more subtly, you can see how 
gendering the decolonized allows him to negotiate the difficulties of agency 
and social forces.  If the decolonized is male, then he must have the power of 
self-determination at some level.  
Conclusion 
In July 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy gave a speech at the University of Dakar 
that addressed the legacy of colonialism and Africa‟s future.  There was a 
curious resonance between some of Sarkozy‟s speech and Memmi‟s book. 
Like Memmi and his “decolonized”, Sarkozy urged the African to full-
fledged agency, to make his own history. 
The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully 
entered into history. The African peasant, who for 
thousands of years has lived according to the seasons, 
whose life ideal was to be in harmony with nature, only 
knew the eternal renewal of time, rhythmed by the 
endless repetition of the same gestures and the same 
words. 
In this imaginary world where everything starts over and 
over again there is no place for human adventure or for 
the idea of progress.  In this universe where nature 
commands all, man escapes from the anguish of history 
that torments modern man, but he rests immobile in the 
centre of a static order where everything seems to have 
been written beforehand. This man (the traditional 
African) never launched himself towards the future. The 
idea never came to him to get out of this repetition and to 
invent his own destiny. The problem of Africa, and allow 
a friend of Africa to say it, is to be found here. Africa‟s 
challenge is to enter to a greater extent into history. To 
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take from it the energy, the force, the desire, the 
willingness to listen and to espouse its own history.20 
How can we interpret the resonance between Sarkozy‟s speech and 
Memmi‟s book?  Sarkozy‟s speech, as Achille Mbembe has pointed out, 
takes directly from the French colonial script. “In all his „candor‟ and 
„sincerity‟, Nicholas Sarkozy openly revealed what, until now, went 
unspoken; that is in both form and content, the intellectual framework 
underlying France‟s policy to Africa literally dates back to the end of the 19th 
century.”21    Memmi, while he may have adopted many of the normative 
positions of his adopted France, would certainly not position himself as the 
colonizer, either.  
Sarkozy‟s speech and Memmi‟s work have a number of illustrative 
similarities:  first the assumption of a notion of universal progress, a 
trajectory of history that Africa still has not entered.  Second, the position of 
an outsider who serves to diagnose what ails the continent.  While many 
postcolonial theorists would rightly point to both the assumption of 
universal progress and the totalizing of subjectivity as problematic, there is 
another issue that deserves recognition as well.   
History matters above all. Both Memmi and Sarkozy acknowledge the 
past of colonialism but they do not position themselves in relation to that 
past.  Instead, they take up the position of outsider, which then leads to a 
terrible and unforgivable flaw.  They do not examine and acknowledge the 
relationship between their own era and what has happened before.  Both of 
them believe in ideologies of progress, assuming that the proper course of 
history means that the past and all of its mistakes are transcended, erased or 
replaced by the flowering of the present.  Given this viewpoint, Memmi and 
Sarkozy do not exhibit a clear understanding that the world they currently 
live in has been impacted by colonialism; in short, they are not-- nor could 
they ever be--outsiders.  
Second, both of them claim that the decolonized has yet to act, yet to 
take up the mantle of agency.  This erases the national liberation movements 
and their importance.  It cannot be denied that power inequalities persist, 
that postcolonial freedom still seems a distant horizon and that the world 
has not changed enough. While this may be true, one cannot exhort more 
action by denying actions that have already occurred.  It is one thing to say 
that decolonization is as yet incomplete but quite another to say that Africa 
stands outside history.  The latter statement tries to obliterate political events 
that changed the world, ending the era of formal colonialism and leading us 
towards this admittedly confused state.  
It may be tempting to erase some of the ambiguities of domination, 
repression, triumph and rage that constitute the postcolonial political 
landscape.  Erasing these ambiguities only orients us backwards in time, as 
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demonstrated by Sarkozy‟s speech in Senegal.  But, postcolonial criticism 
needs to be as messy as the world it dissects.  
In the end, the fact that Sarkozy and Memmi are telling similar stories 
shows that Memmi started from the wrong presupposition.  Remember that 
he overcame his reluctance to write the book because he thought that the 
world was telling the wrong story about decolonization.  But to say that 
decolonization has not been achieved is not the same as to say that it has not 
been started.   Decolonization will not be simple, and it will not be achieved 
outside of the relational dynamics of power and powerlessness that Memmi 
attempted to describe in Decolonization.  Whether Memmi has become 
“French” is irrelevant; what matters is that he is speaking the same truth as 
those in power.  
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